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Abstract
Coalition formation is a fundamental research topic
in multi-agent systems. In this context, while it
is desirable to generate a coalition structure that
maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions,
the space of possible solutions is often too large
to allow exhaustive search. Thus, a fundamental
open question in this area is the following: Can we
search through only a subset of coalition structures,
and be guaranteed to ﬁnd a solution that is within
a desirable bound  from optimum? If so, what is
the minimum such subset?
To date, the above question has only been partially
answered by Sandholm et al. in their seminal work
on anytime coalition structure generation [Sand-
holm et al., 1999]. More speciﬁcally, they identi-
ﬁed minimum subsets to be searched for two par-
ticular bounds:  = n and  = dn=2e. Neverthe-
less, the question remained open for other values of
. In this paper, we provide the complete answer to
this question.
1 Introduction
An important feature of many multi-agent systems is the abil-
ity of agents to form coalitions in order to coordinate their
actions and increase individual and collective performance.
Coalition formation has been studied in many settings, in-
cluding e-commerce ([Tsvetovat et al., 2000]), distributed ve-
hicle routing ([Sandholm and Lesser, 1997]) or multi-sensor
networks ([Dang et al., 2006]).
One of the key challenges in coalition formation is Coali-
tion Structure Generation (CSG) — the problem of ﬁnding a
coalition structure, i.e. an exhaustive and disjoint division of
agents into coalitions, such that the performance of the entire
system is optimised. In this context, it is usually assumed that
the value of a coalition does not depend on the actions of non-
members. Such settings are known as characteristic function
games (CFGs). Many (but clearly not all) real-world multi-
agent problems happen to be CFGs [Sandholm et al., 1999;
Sandholm and Lesser, 1997].
Finding the optimal coalition structure in a CFG setting is
a challenging combinatorial problem as the number of pos-
sible solutions grows in O(nn) for n agents. Various search
techniques have been proposed to tackle this problem, includ-
ing dynamic programming, linear programming, breadth-ﬁrst
search, depth-ﬁrst search, and other heuristic and stochastic
methods (see, e.g., [Shehory and Kraus, 1998; Sandholm et
al., 1999; Sen and Dutta, 2000; Dang and Jennings, 2004;
Rahwan et al., 2009b]). In this context, an important line of
research is the development of anytime CSG algorithms. In
particular, an algorithm is “anytime” if it can return a solution
at any point of time during its execution, and the quality of its
solution improves monotonically until termination. This is
particularly desirable in the multi-agent system context since
the agents might not always have sufﬁcient time to run the
algorithm to completion, especially when the search space
of the problem at hand is of exponential size as in the CSG
case. Moreover, being anytime makes the algorithm more
robust against failure; if the execution is stopped before the
algorithm would have normally terminated, then it would still
provide the agents with a solution that is better than the initial
solution, or any other intermediate one.
Thus, a fundamental open question in this line of research
is the following [Sandholm et al., 1999]: If the space of pos-
sible solutions is too large to allow exhaustive search, then:
Can we search through only a subset of this space,
and be guaranteed to ﬁnd a solution that is within a
desirable bound  from optimum? If so, what is the
minimum such subset?
To date, the above question has only been partially an-
swered by Sandholm et al. in their seminal work on anytime
coalition structure generation [Sandholm et al., 1999]. More
speciﬁcally, they only answered this question for two partic-
ular values of : n and dn=2e (see the related-work section
for more details). This question, however, remained open for
other values of .
Against this background, we provide in this paper the com-
plete answer to the above question. That is, we identify the
minimum subset of coalition structures that must be searched
to establish any desirable bound .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
formalize the coalition structure generation problem. We then
present our main results in Section 3. In Section 4, we present
a brief overview of the related work. Finally, in Section 5, we
discuss new challenges that stem from our work.2 Preliminaries
In this section we formally introduce the basic notation used
throughout the paper. Let A = fa1;a2; ;ang be the
set of agents and C the set of all coalitions. More for-
mally, C = fC : C  A;C 6= ;g. A coalition structure
CS = fC1;C2; ;CjCSjgisapartitionofA, i.e., itsatisﬁes
the following conditions: (a) 8i 2 f1; ;jCSjg;Ci 6= ;;
(b) [
jCSj
i=1 Ci = A; and (c) 8i;j 2 f1; ;jCSjg : i 6=
j;Ci \ Cj = ;. We will denote the set of all coalition struc-
tures as n.
A characteristic function assigns a real value v(C) 2 R to
every coalition C 2 C which reﬂects its performance. The
value of any coalition structure CS 2 n is the sum of the
values of the coalitions in it, and is denoted as V (CS). For-
mally, 8CS 2 n;V (CS) =
P
C2CS v(C). The CSG prob-
lem is, then, to ﬁnd an optimal coalition structure CS
 2 n,
deﬁned as:
CS
 = arg max
CS2n
V (CS)
Throughout the paper, we assume that the following holds:
8C 2 C v(C)  0 (1)
In the appendix we demonstrate that the above assumption re-
sults in no loss of generality as far as the solution to the CSG
problem is concerned. Laso in the appendix we summarise
the main notations used throughout the paper.
3 Answering the Open Question
This section presents our main theorems. In particular, the
ﬁrst four of them are concerned with a generalized case,
where two arbitrary sets of coalition structures 0;00  n
are given, and the aim is to establish a bound  on the best
solution in 0 with respect to the best one in 00. These four
theorems lay the foundation to our ﬁnal theorem, corollary of
which constitutes the solution to the open question posed in
the introduction.
In what follows we will need the following additional no-
tation. For any coalition structure CS 2 n, let P(CS) be
the set of possible partitions of CS. That is,
P(CS) = fP : [P = CS ^8Pi;Pj 2 P : i 6= j;Pi\Pj = ;g
For instance, given CS = ffa1g;fa2;a3g;fa4gg, the set
P(CS) consists of the possible partitions of CS, which are:
fffa1gg;ffa2;a3gg;ffa4ggg, fffa1g;fa2;a3gg;ffa4ggg,
fffa1gg;ffa2;a3g;fa4ggg, fffa1g;fa4gg;ffa2;a3ggg,
and fffa1g;fa2;a3g;fa4ggg.
Moreover, for any set of coalition structures 0  n, let
(0) be the set that consists of every non-empty subset of
every coalition structure in 0. That is:
(0) =
[
CS20
[
CS;6=;
fg (2)
For example, given the following set of coalition struc-
tures: 0 = fffa1;a2g;fa3gg;ffa1g;fa2;a3ggg, the set
(0) consists of all non-empty subsets of the two coalition
structures in 0. In other words, it consists of following
six subsets: ffa1;a2gg, ffa3gg, ffa1;a2g,fa3gg, ffa1gg,
ffa2;a3gg, and ffa1g;fa2;a3gg.
We start with proving the following:
Theorem 1 For any twosets of coalition structures0;00 
n, if:
8CS 2 00 : 9P 2 P(CS) : P  (0) (3)
then the following holds:
maxCS200 V (CS)
maxCS20 V (CS)
 max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj

(4)
In other words, if the subsets in (0) can partition ev-
ery coalition structure in 00, then the best coalition structure
in 0 is within a bound from the best one in 00. To compute
this bound, we ﬁrst compute for every coalition structure
CS 2 00 the size of the smallest subset of (0) that
partitions CS. The bound is then equal to the largest such
size.
Proof. Assuming that condition (3) holds, let CS
 be the
best coalition structure in 00, and P = fP
1 ; ;P
jP jg be
the smallest subset of (0) that partitions CS
, i.e.,
CS
 = arg max
CS200 V (CS) (5)
P = arg min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj (6)
Now, since P is a partition of CS
, then we can write
V (CS
) as follows:
V (CS
) =
X
C2P 
1
v(C) +  +
X
C2P 
jPj
v(C)
This, in turn, implies that:
V (CS
)  jPj  max
P 
i 2P 
X
C2P 
i
v(C) (7)
Furthermore, from (6), we know that:
jPj  max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj

(8)
From (7) and (8), we ﬁnd that:
V (CS
)  max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj


 max
P 
i 2P 
X
C2P 
i
v(C) (9)
Moreover, since P  (0), then 8P
i 2 P 9CS 2 0 :
P
i  CS. This implies that:
9CS 2 0 : max
P 
i 2P 
X
C2P 
i
v(C)  V (CS) (10)
From (9) and (10), we ﬁnd that there exists CS 2 0:
V (CS
)  max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj

 V (CS)
This, as well as (5), imply that (4) holds.
Secondly, we prove that the bound obtained in Theorem 1
cannot be improved upon.
Theorem 2 The bound in Theorem 1 is tight.
Proof. Given two sets of coalition structures 0;00  n
such that condition (3) holds, we will construct a worst case
where:
maxCS200 V (CS)
maxCS20 V (CS)
= max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj

First, let us deﬁne f CS and e P = fe P1;:::; e P j e Pjg as follows:
f CS = arg max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj

e P = arg min
P2P( f CS):P(0)
jPj
Based on this, we need to construct a worst case where:
maxCS200 V (CS)
maxCS20 V (CS)
= je Pj (11)
Since e P is a partition of f CS, then we can write V (f CS) as
follows:
V (f CS) =
X
e Pi2 e P
X
C2 e Pi
v(C) (12)
Now assume that the following holds:
8e Pi 2 e P;je Pij = 1
In other words, assume that every e Pi contains exactly one
coalition, and let us denote this coalition as e Ci. Also assume
that:
8C 2 C;v(C) =
8
<
:
1 if C 2 fe C1;:::; e Cj e Pjg
0 otherwise
(13)
Finally, assume that:
f CS = arg max
CS200 V (CS) (14)
From equations (12), (13) and (14), we ﬁnd that:
max
CS200 V (CS) = je Pj (15)
Now since e P is the smallest partition of f CS in (0), then
this implies that:
8CS 2 0;


CS \ fe C1;:::; e Cj e Pjg


  1 (16)
From (13) and (16), we ﬁnd that:
max
CS20 V (CS) = 1 (17)
From (15) and (17), we ﬁnd that (11) holds.

Thirdly, we prove that the condition in Theorem 1 is nec-
essary to obtain a ﬁnite bound.
Theorem 3 For any twosets of coalition structures0;00 
n, condition (3) must hold in order to establish a ﬁnite
bound on maxCS200 V (CS)=maxCS20 V (CS).
Proof. Assume that condition (3) does not hold. In other
words, assume that:
9CS 2 00 : 8P 2 P(CS) : P * (0)
This implies that:
9CS 2 00 : ffCg : C 2 CSg * (0) (18)
Now, from the deﬁnition of (0) in (2), we know that:
8CS 2 0;8C 2 CS : fCg 2 (0) (19)
From (18) and (19), we ﬁnd that:
9CS 2 00 : 9C 2 CS : 8CS
0 2 0;C = 2 CS0 (20)
In other words, there exists a coalition that does not appear
in any of the coalitions in 0, but appears in at least one of
the coalition structures in 00. Now since this coalition could
be arbitrarily better than every other coalition in C, then the
coalition structures containing it could be arbitrarily better
than those not containing it. 
While the above theorem is concerned with the necessary
condition to establish a ﬁnite bound , the following theo-
rem is concerned with the necessary condition to establish a
particular bound  = b, where 1  b  n.
Theorem 4 Foranysetofcoalitionstructures00  n, and
for any b : 1  b  n, in order to search a subset 0  00
and be guaranteed to ﬁnd a coalition structure of which the
value is within a bound   b from maxCS200 V (CS), it is
necessary that 0 satisﬁes the following condition:
max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj

 b (21)
Proof. Assuming that 0 does not satisfy condition
(21), we will prove that it is not possible to ﬁnd a coalition
structure in 0 of which the value is within a bound   b
from maxCS200 V (CS). In other words, we will prove that:
maxCS200 V (CS)
maxCS20 V (CS)
> b (22)
From Theorem 3, we know that 0 must satisfy condition
(3) in order to establish a ﬁnite bound on maxCS20 V (CS).
This, in turn, implies that the inequality in (4) holds (see The-
orem 1). Finally, from Theorem 2, we know that it is possible
to have a case where:
maxCS200 V (CS)
maxCS20 V (CS)
= max
CS200

min
P2P(CS):P(0)
jPj

Based on this, as well as the fact that 0 does not satisfy con-
dition (21), we ﬁnd that the inequality in (22) holds.
For any b : 1  b  n, let b
n  n be the minimum set
guaranteed to contain a coalition structure of which the value
is within a bound   b from the optimal one, i.e.:
maxCS2n V (CS)
maxCS2b
n V (CS)
 b
Moreover, let In be the set of integer partitions of n and, for
any integer partition I = fi1; ;ijIjg 2 In, let SI  n
be deﬁned as follows:
SI = ffC1; ;CjIjg 2 n : fjC1j; ;jCjIjjg = Ig
In other words, SI contains every coalition structure contain-
ing coalitions of which the sizes match the integers in I. For
instance, given n = 4, we have:
I4 = ff4g
|{z}
I1
;f1;3g
| {z }
I2
;f2;2g
| {z }
I3
;f1;1;2g
| {z }
I4
;f1;1;1;1g
| {z }
I5
g
SI1=ffa1;a2;a3;a4gg
SI4=
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
fa1g;fa2g;fa3;a4g
fa1g;fa3g;fa2;a4g
fa1g;fa4g;fa2;a3g
fa2g;fa3g;fa1;a4g
fa2g;fa4g;fa1;a3g
fa3g;fa4g;fa1;a2g
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
SI2=
8
> <
> :
fa1g;fa2;a3;a4g
fa2g;fa1;a3;a4g
fa3g;fa1;a2;a4g
fa4g;fa1;a2;a3g
9
> =
> ;
SI3=
(fa1;a2g;fa3;a4g
fa1;a3g;fa2;a4g
fa1;a4g;fa2;a3g
)
SI5=ffa1g;fa2g;fa3g;fa4gg
Now, our ﬁnal theorem is as follows:
Theorem 5 For any b : 1  b  n, there exists I0
n  In
such that: [
I2I0
n
SI = b
n (23)
Proof. In order to prove Theorem 5, it is sufﬁcient to
prove that, for any I 2 In, and for any two coalition
structures CS
0;CS
00 2 SI, we will show that:
CS
0 = 2 b
n ) CS
00 = 2 b
n (24)
Now, for any coalition structure CS 2 n, let us deﬁne
n(CS) as follows:
n(CS) = f0 : 0  n;0 3 CSg
Based on this, we have:
CS
0 = 2 b
n , 80 2 n(CS
0);0 6= b
n (25)
To this end, note that, for any subset e   n, there are ex-
actly two properties based on which it is determined whether
e  = b
n:
1. The number of coalition structures in e , i.e., je j.
2. The ability of the elements in (e ) to partition the coali-
tion structures in ne . This is measured as the maxi-
mum of the sizes of the smallest partitions of the coali-
tion structures in ne , where the parts of the partitions
are elements of (e ).
Now since both CS
0 and CS
00 belong to the same subset SI,
then, by only changing the indices of the agents, it is possi-
ble to transform CS
0 into CS
00. For example, given CS
0 =
ffa1g;fa2g;fa3;a4gg;CS
00 = ffa2g;fa4g;fa1;a3gg, it is
possible to transform CS
0 into CS
00 by only changing the in-
dices of the agents such that a1, a2, a3 and a4 become a2,
a4, a1 and a3 respectively, and that is because CS
0 and CS
00
belong to the same subset Sf1;1;2g. In a similar way (i.e.,
by only changing the indices of the agents) it is possible to
transform any subset 0 2 n(CS
0) into exactly one sub-
set 00 2 n(CS
00). What is particularly important is the
fact that the above two properties are exactly the same for 0
and 00 since the transformation only involved changing the
agents’ indices, and these do not have any effect on the above
two properties. As a result, if b
n 6= 0, then b
n 6= 00. This
means:
802n(CS
0);06= b
n ) 8002n(CS
00);006= b
n
(26)
From (25) and (26), we ﬁnd that (24) holds.

Having introduced the above ﬁve theorems, for any integer
partition I 2 In, let us deﬁne P(I) to be the set of possible
partitions of I. That is,
P(I) = fP : [P = I ^ 8Pi;Pj 2 P : i 6= j;Pi \ Pj = ;g
For instance, given n = 4, the set P(f1;1;2g) consists of
the following four partitions: ff1g;f1g;f2gg, ff1;1g;f2gg,
ff1;2g;f1gg, and ff1;1;2gg.
Moreover, for any set of integer partitions I0
n  In, let
(I0
n) be the set that consists of every non-empty subset of
every integer partition in I0
n. That is:
(I0
n) =
[
I2I0
n
[
I;6=;
fg (27)
For example, given I0
4 = ff1;1;2g;f1;3gg, the set (I0
n)
consists of the following seven subsets: ff1gg, ff2gg,
ff3gg, ff1;1gg, ff1;2gg, ff1;3gg, ff1;1;2gg. Finally, let
In(b) be deﬁned as follows:
In(b)=

I0
n : (I0
n  In) ^
(8I 2 In:9P 2 P(I):P  (I0
n);jPj  b)

(28)
That is, In(b) consists of integer partitions such that, if we
takeeverysubsetofeveryindividualintegerpartitioninIn(b)
— i.e., if we take every subset in [I2In(b)(I) — then these
subsets are sufﬁcient to partition every integer partition in In
into at most b parts.
Now, we obtain from Theorems 1-5 the following corol-
lary:
Corollary 1 For any b : 1  b  n, it holds that:
b
n = arg min
I0
n2In(b)

[I2I0
nSI

 (29)
Equation (29) provides the complete answer to the open
question, i.e., it identiﬁes b
n — the minimum subset of the
coalition structure space that is guaranteed to contain at leastone coalition structure of which the value is within a bound
 = b from the value of the optimal coalition structure, where
1  b  n.1
4 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the relevant anytime approaches to
the CSG problem.2 In particular, these can be divided into
two categories:
1. The ﬁrst tries to improve the quality of the solution as
quickly as possible using various search techniques. Ar-
guably, the state-of-the-art algorithm in this category
is the IP algorithm by Rahwan et al. [Rahwan et al.,
2009b]. While this algorithm does generate an initial
boundofdn=2eonitssolutionquality, theprocessofim-
proving upon this bound depends entirely on the values
of the characteristic function. Thus, in a general case,
there are no guarantees on how this bound will drop over
time, if it drops at all.
2. In the second category, the search process consists of
a number of steps such that, at each step, a particular
subset of the search spaces is searched. This is designed
such that, after completing particular steps, the bound is
guaranteed to drop to a certain value.
Since our approach belongs to the latter category, we will
discuss the algorithms that belong to it in more detail. In par-
ticular, the ﬁrst such study is due to Sandholm et al. [Sand-
holm et al., 1999], who showed that the minimum subset of
coalition structures that has to be searched in order to estab-
lish any theoretical worst-case bound contains 2n 1 coalition
structures, which are those containing less than three coali-
tions. In this case,  = n. Interestingly, they also showed
that, by searching one more coalition structure, which is the
one containing n coalitions, the bound drops to dn=2e. After
that, to drop the bound below dn=2e, the authors proposed
to search the remaining coalition structures as follows. They
ﬁrst search the subset containing all the coalition structures
that are made of exactly n 1 coalitions, then the subset con-
taining all those that are made of n   2 coalitions, and so on
and so forth.
An alternative sequence to drop the bound below dn=2e
was proposed by Dang and Jennings [Dang and Jennings,
2004]. In more detail, they search through the subsets con-
taining coalition structures that have at least one coalition of
which the size is not less than dn(d   1)=de, where d is ﬁrst
equal to b(n + 1)=4c, and then equal to b(n + 1)=4c 1, and
so on until d = 2. It was shown that the bound drops for
every d.
More recently, Rahwan et al. [Rahwan et al., 2009a] anal-
ysed the issue of establishing worst-case bounds in partition
function games (PFGs) — a more general type of games
where a coalition can have different values in different coali-
tion structures due to externalities (i.e., inﬂuences caused by
1Note that it is impossible to obtain a ﬁnite bound greater than n
[Sandholm et al., 1999]. Moreover, the bound, by deﬁnition, cannot
be smaller than 1.
2Foranoverviewofotherapproaches, see[Rahwanetal., 2009b]
the formation of other coalitions). More speciﬁcally, Rah-
wan et al. proposed two sequences to establish progressively
better bounds in PFG+ and PFG  — two special cases of
PFGs where all externalities are weakly positive and weakly
negative respectively. Although these sequences are designed
to suit speciﬁc requirements of either PFG+ or PFG , in
principle, they can also be used in CFGs as CFG  PFG+
and CFG  PFG .
Given 9 agents, we provide in Table 1 the numbers of coali-
tion structures searched by each of the above algorithms to
establish different bound , and compare these to the opti-
mal numbers obtained using equation (29). This shows that
none of the sequences proposed in previous works is optimal.
For example, to ﬁnd a coalition structure that is guaranteed to
be within a bound  = 3 from the optimum, the number of
coalition structures that has to be searched by Rahwan et al.’s
algorithm is 1132, and by Sandholm et al.’s is 755 and by
Dang and Jennings’s is 2393. However, following equation
(29), we ﬁnd that the minimum subset, which is:
b
n = Sf9g [ Sf1;8g [ Sf2;7g [ Sf3;6g [ Sf4;5g
[Sf1;1;1;1;1;2;2g [ Sf1;1;1;1;1;1;1;2g [ Sf1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1g
contains only 671 coalition structures.
 Rahwan Sandholm Dang & optimal
et al. et. al Jennings
9 256 256 256 256
5 292 257 257 257
4 628 293 2393 293
3 1132 755 2393 671
2 6110 10352 21147 2337
1 21147 21147 21147 21147
Table 1: The number of coalition that need to be searched in
order to establish a particular bound.
5 Discussion
By solving the open question that was posed in the introduc-
tion, we open a new one. In particular, the new question is
related to the computational complexity of identifying the
coalition structures that belong to b
n given any value of n
and b. As can be seen from equation (29), the challenge is as
follows:
For any value of n and b, how to efﬁciently compute a
subset I0 of the integer partitions of n such that:
– bysolelyusingeverypossiblesubsetofeveryI 2
I0, we can partition every integer partition of n
into at most b parts? and
– if there are more than one such subset, how to ef-
ﬁciently compute the one for which the union of
the corresponding subspaces of the integer par-
titions is of minimal size?
Note that the solution to the above question involves solv-
ing several Set Partitioning Problems (SPPs) which are eachNP-hard [Garey and Johnson, 1990]. We envisage that this
question will trigger signiﬁcant interest in the research com-
munity. In this context, it should be observed that the mini-
mum subsets have to be computed only once as they are in-
dependent of coalition values. Thus, once computed for a
certain number of agents (e.g., n = 25), they can be stored
and re-used whenever a problem is encountered that has that
same number of agents.
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A Summary of Notation
 Bound from the optimum.
A The set of agents.
ai An agent in A.
n The number of agents in A.
C A coalition.
C The set of all coalitions over A.
CS A coalition structure.
P(CS) The set of possible partitions of CS.
CS An optimal coalition structure.
 A set of coalition structures.
n The set of all coalition structures for n agents.
b
n
A minimum set guaranteed to contain a coalition struc-
ture of which the value is within a bound  = b from
the optimum.
() The set that consists of every non-empty subset of ev-
ery coalition structure in .
I An integer partition.
In The set of integer partitions of n.
SI
The subspace of coalition structures in which the sizes
of the coalitions match integers in I.
P(I) The set of possible partitions of I.
(In) The set that consists of every the non-empty subset of
every integer partition in In.
B Note on the Assumption in (1)
We will show how any real-valued characteristic function
bounded from below (i.e. without inﬁnitely negative values
of coalitions) can be transformed so as to meet the condi-
tion in (1). While such a transformation can be done by
simply subtracting from every coalition’s value the following
amount: minCS2n v(C) (see, e.g., [Sandholm et al., 1999;
Ohta et al., 2009]), we note that this may result in a signif-
icant change to the CSG problem. Speciﬁcally, the value of
any coalition structure containing s coalitions would increase
by s  abs(minCS2n v(C)), where abs() denotes the ab-
solute value. Since this increase differs from one coalition
structure to another, the optimal solution to the CSG prob-
lem may change. To circumvent this problem, we propose to
transform the characteristic function as follows:
8C 2 C v0(C) = v(C)  

min(0; min
C02C
v(C0))  jCj

By so doing, the value of every coalition structure increases
by exactly the same amount, which is the absolute value of:
n  min(0;minC2C v(C)). Thus, it will not change (an) op-
timal coalition structure(s). Nevertheless, it may affect the
ratio between value of any suboptimal coalition structure and
the optimal one(s).3
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